

Climate policy under socio-economic scenario uncertainty

Laurent Drouet and Johannes Emmerling¹

¹Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) and CMCC

IAMC Meeting, Nov 16th, 2015, Potsdam



Motivation

- Socioeconomic Drivers of the five SSPs
- Climate policies under very different baseline assumptions
- Policy costs or impacts under different GDP and population scenarios



Motivation

- Socioeconomic Drivers of the five SSPs
- Climate policies under very different baseline assumptions
- Policy costs or impacts under different GDP and population scenarios

- **Research questions**
 - 1 What is a robust and optimal climate policy under “baseline” uncertainty?
 - 2 How can policy costs and other measures be compared if different baselines are considered?
 - 3 How can scenario development exercises inform decisions under uncertainty taking into account the different “worlds” described



The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs)





Figure 1. The Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) of the new IPCC-guided scenario set. Taken from O'Neill et al. (2012).

- Consider only different baseline assumptions about GDP and population (OECD/IIASA)!




GDP and Population of the SSPs

Generate 50 baselines generated from the four extreme SSP baseline as a convex combination of population and GDP per capita



GDP and Population of the SSPs

Samples pathways and comparison to the SSP2 “Middle of the road”



Spatial Heterogeneity of Climate Change

- Additionally, running 100 carbon budgets (500-7000 $GtCO_2$) for each sampled pathway (5,000 runs in total)
- running the IAM WITCH for each scenario and policy ($CB_{2000-2100}$)

$$\max \sum_{t,r} w_{t,r} l_{t,r} \frac{(c_{t,r})^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} \frac{1}{(1+\delta)^t} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{t,r} emi(c_{t,r}) \leq CB$$




Spatial Heterogeneity of Climate Change

- Additionally, running 100 carbon budgets (500-7000 GtCO₂) for each sampled pathway (5,000 runs in total)
- running the IAM WITCH for each scenario and policy (CB_{2000–2100})

$$\max \sum_{t,r} w_{t,r} l_{t,r} \frac{(c_{t,r})^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} \frac{1}{(1+\delta)^t} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{t,r} emi(c_{t,r}) \leq CB$$

- Including damages from climate change (CLIMCOST damage function)




⇒ $W(CB; Y, L)$



Example of the optimal climate policy

Value function for the baseline $(\alpha_1, \alpha_3, \alpha_4, \alpha_5) = (0, 0, 1/9, 8/9)$



Decision framework

Deterministic case:

$$\forall \{Y, L\} : CB_{DET}^*(Y, L) = \underset{CB}{\operatorname{argmax}} W(Y, L, CB) \quad (1)$$

Under uncertainty: expected utility


$$CB_{EU}^* = \underset{CB}{\operatorname{argmax}} E_0 W(\tilde{Y}, \tilde{L}, CB) \quad (2)$$

Disentangled Epstein-Zin SWF (relative risk aversion $\rho \neq \eta$)


$$CB_{DIS}^* = \underset{CB}{\operatorname{argmax}} E_0 \frac{1}{1-\rho} \left(\left\{ (1-\eta)W(CB; \tilde{Y}, \tilde{L}) + 1 \right\}^{\frac{1-\rho}{1-\eta}} - 1 \right) \quad (3)$$



Decision framework



Optimal deterministic CB




The effect of risk aversion



Decision framework - results

■ Optimal carbon budgets for all decision rules



Policy cost measures

- (discounted) Policy/damage cost measure:

$$PC = E \frac{\sum_{t=0}^T l_t (c_t^{pol} - c_t^{bau}) \frac{1}{(1+r)^t}}{\sum_{t=0}^T l_t c_t^{bau} \frac{1}{(1+r)^t}}$$

- Baseline GDP and population important, choice of discount rate matters.



Policy cost measures

- (discounted) Policy/damage cost measure:

$$PC = E \frac{\sum_{t=0}^T l_t (c_t^{pol} - c_t^{bau}) \frac{1}{(1+r)^t}}{\sum_{t=0}^T l_t c_t^{bau} \frac{1}{(1+r)^t}}$$

- Baseline GDP and population important, choice of discount rate matters.
- One way to avoid the dependence of different future growth scenarios is the use of a Balanced Growth Equivalent (Mirrlees, 1972):

$$CEBGE = \left[\frac{EW(1-\eta)}{\sum_{t=0}^T E l_t \frac{(1+g)^{(1-\eta)t}}{(1+\delta)^t} dt} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \implies \Delta CEBGE \equiv \frac{CEBGE^{pol}}{CEBGE^{bau}} - 1$$

- Properties:
 - independent of the assumed growth rate g
 - welfare-based compatible with the IAM framework
 - Collapses to PC for $\eta = 0$ and $\delta = r$




Policy cost measures across different baselines

- Example: Compare the different policy/damage cost measures for impacts from climate change and a two degree target (with impacts!) across different baselines summarized by total global GDP




Policy cost measures across different baselines

- Example: Compare the different policy/damage cost measures for impacts from climate change and a two degree target (with impacts!) across different baselines summarized by total global GDP



(a) Damage costs of climate change




(b) Policy costs of a two-degree target

- According to the CEBGE, higher baselines lead to lower damage costs, but higher mitigation costs



Optimal climate policy and cost measures

- Compare the different measures of net policy costs (mitigation costs and impacts) across the range of policies/carbon budgets considered:



Results

- Comparison of different expected policy cost measures:

Decision criterion	CB	$\Delta CEBGE$	$PC_{r=0\%}$	$PC_{r=1\%}$	$PC_{r=3\%}$
$E_0 W(CB_{DET}^*(\tilde{Y}, \tilde{L}); \tilde{Y}, \tilde{L})$	varying	-0.58%	-6.7%	-5.2%	-2.7%
$E_0 W(CB_{EU}^*; \tilde{Y}, \tilde{L})$	3645	-0.63%	-6.7%	-5.2%	-2.8%
$E_0 W(CB_{DIS}^*; \tilde{Y}, \tilde{L}), \rho = 20$	2953	-0.75%	-6.9%	-5.7%	-3.2%

- Overall, total socioeconomic uncertainty increases the welfare costs from climate change by about 29% (based on the EVPI)
- Rather balanced evaluation based on the $CEBGE$, sensitive to discount rate for the PC measures.



Conclusion

- Socioeconomic baseline uncertainty plays an important role for the optimal climate policy
- Comparing policy/damage costs for different baseline is not trivial
- Impact costs seem higher in low baselines, policy costs of stringent policies for high baselines (like SSP5)
- The SSP provide a useful and broad framework for describing the substantial socioeconomic uncertainties
- Numerically, we find that baseline uncertainty increases the welfare cost from climate change by about one fourth



Conclusion

Thank you!

